Goodman v. Harris [DISSENT] by Carter, Jesse W.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions The Jesse Carter Collection
2-17-1953
Goodman v. Harris [DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Torts Commons
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Goodman v. Harris [DISSENT]" (1953). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 329.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/329
254 GOODMAN v. HARRIS [40 C.2d 
[S. F. No. 18688. In Bank. Feb. 17, 1953.] 
ARTHUR RALPH GOODMAN et al., Appellants, v. E. L. 
HARRIS et al., Defendants; PACIFIC GAS & ELEC-
TRIC COMPANY, Respondent. 
[1] Landlord and Tenant-Injuries to Third. Persons-Patrons of 
Lessee.-A lessor who leases property for a purpose involv-
ing the admission of the public is under a duty to see that 
it is safe for the purposes intended, and to exercise reason-
able care to inspect and repair the property before possession 
is transferred so as to prevent any unreasonable risk of harm 
to the public who may enter. 
[2] Fixtures-Questions of Law and Fact.-Whether a butane gas 
heater was so affixed to leased premises as to become a part 
of the realty belonging to the lessor rather than personalty 
belonging to the lessees is not an issue of fact to be sub-
mitted to the jury where the evidence shows that such heater 
was a small and easily portable piece of equipment, not 
fastened down in any manner but "just sitting there" on 
the floor, and that, while it was connected to a gas pipe inlet, 
it could be detached simply and easily without affecting the 
premises. 
[3] Landlord and Tenant-Injuries to Third Persons-Evidence.-
An inference that a cabin equipped with an unvented butane 
gas heater on premises leased for operation of a motel was 
unsuitable for human occupancy may not be drawn from 
evidence that the cabin did not meet statutory requirements 
of construction for rental as an overnight accommodation 
for transients, especially where the state's inspector told the 
lessees that it was permissible to rent the cabin by the week 
or month, and where it appears that the cabin had a vent 
which could be connected with a heating unit, that the vent 
was not faulty, and that the cabin had windows and a door 
which could be opened easily. 
[4] !d.-Injuries to Third Persons-Evidence.-Mere fact that a 
gas feeder line entered a cabin, equipped with a defective 
unvented heater on premises leased for operation of a motel, 
at a point on the wall opposite the location of a vent is not 
[1] Landlord's liability for personal injuries to one who enters 
as a business patron on leased premises within tenant's exclusive 
control, note, 123 A.L.R. 870. See, also, Cal.Jur., Landlord and 
Tenant, § 150; Am.Jur., Landlord and Tenant, § 667. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Landlord and Tenant, § 316; [2] 
Fixtures,§ 27; [3, 4] Landlord and Tenant,§ 318(2); [5-10] Land-
lord and Tenant, § 318. 
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basis for an inference that a safe heating unit could not have 
been installed where there is no showing that the pipe was 
incapable of extension, that a vented heater could not have 
been installed, or that a proper unvented heater would have 
been unsafe if installed. 
[5] !d.-Injuries to Third Persons-Patrons of Lessee.-A lessor 
of premises leased for operation of a motel may not be held 
liable for death of one motel guest and permanent injury to 
another as a result of excessive carbon monoxide fumes from 
a defective butane gas heater in a cabin which they were 
occupying overnight, where the evidence at most discloses 
the negligent operation of such heater in the cabin which 
was otherwise safe and suitable for human habitation, and 
where there is no basis for the inference that the heater, 
although defective, would have caused injury if operated with 
circumspection in a properly ventilated room. 
[6] !d.-Injuries to Third Persons-Patrons of Lessee.-A lessor 
of premises leased for operation of a motel may be held liable 
for death of one motel guest and permanent injury to an-
other, which resulted from asphyxiation by carbon monoxide 
fumes from a defective butane gas heater in a cabin which 
they were occupying overnight, only if the lessor was re-
sponsible for a latent dangerous condition of lessees' property 
at the time of execution of the lease, there being no liability 
for defective condition of property other than that leased or 
existing as a structural part of the property leased. 
[7] !d.-Injuries to Third Persons-Liability of Lessor.-Where 
injury to third persons results from activity of lessee on 
premises which, by reason of some defect, are not reasonably 
suitable for such conduct, the lessor may be held liable, not 
for the fault of the lessee, but only for his own fault in 
renting property not safe for the activity to be conducted. 
[8] !d.-Injuries to Third Persons-Duties of Lessor.-Duty of 
invitor-lessor with respect to safety of leased premises does 
not extend to matters having to do merely with lessee's man-
agement or operation of premises which would be safe but 
for such management or operation, at least where the lessee 
is in sole actual control. 
[9] !d.-Injuries to Third Persons-Duties of Lessor.-A lessor 
of premises leased for operation of a motel has a duty to 
see that the property is reasonably safe for the purposes for 
which it is to be used and the right to repair such defects 
as he might discover in the premises, but he is under no obli-
gation to inspect property which he does not own and which 
lessee intends to use in operation of his business. 
[10] !d.-Injuries to Third Persons-Duties of Lessor.-The rule 
that a lessor must make his property safe for the purposes 
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for which it is to be used cannot be extended to require him 
to insure, against defects in, or negligent operation of, the 
property of another which may be brought on his premises 
for the conduct of the business. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the 
City and County of San Francisco. 
Judge. Affirmed. 
Superior Court of the 
Alvin E. Weinberger, 
Action for damages for personal injuries and for wrongful 
death. Judgment of nonsuit affirmed. 
Belli, Ashe & Pinney, Melvin M. Belli, Betsy Fitzgerald 
Rahn and Van H. Pinney for Appellants. 
Robert H. Gerdes and Frederick W. Mielke, Jr., for Re-
spondent. 
EDMONDS, J.-Arthur Ralph Goodman, Jr., died and 
Janet McCrum sustained permanent injuries as the result 
of inhaling carbon monoxide from a butane gas heater in a 
cabin which they were occupying overnight. Janet and the 
heirs of Arthur have appealed from a judgment of nonsuit 
in favor of Pacific Gas and Electric Company, the owner of 
the property where the accident occurred. 
E. L. Harris, the corporation's tenant, and his wife Dorothy 
were in possession and control of the premises. Mr. and Mrs. 
Harris, Helen M. Karteus, his mother, and P. G. & E. were 
sued for damages by Janet and the heirs of Arthur. 
According to the complaint, the Harrises ''were the lessees 
in possession who . . . operated and maintained certain tour-
ist cabins, a restaurant and bar'' and a garage, which property 
was owned by P. G. & E. The property and improvements, 
it was alleged, were leased by P. G. & E. with knowledge 
that they were to be used ''for rental as lodgings by the general 
public'' and that there existed upon the premises ''a dan-
gerous and defective condition" in that the "tourist cabins 
were so negligently constructed, maintained and operated, and 
the heating appliances thereon were so dangerous and de-
fective as to be dangerous, unsafe and unsuited for the purpose 
for which they were to be used.'' The complaint further alleged 
that Arthur and Janet were ''invited to and did rent one of 
the tourist cabins . . . as a lodging for the night'' and that 
the ''defendants so negligently maintained, heated, supervised, 
constructed, managed and operated'' the cabin ''that the 
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gas ,.;tovc . . . am1 the premises . . . were defective, dan-
gqrrou,.; and a peril to hnman life." It was claimed that Arthur 
uied aucl ,Janet ,.;nffered permanent injuries "solely by reason 
of such negligence, and as a proximate consequence thereof~" 
The separate demurrers of the defendants were overruled. 
lJater, a motion by P. G. & E. for judgment on the pleadings 
was denied. 
By its answer, P. G. & E. admitteu that it owned the 
real property and that the Harrises were in possession of and 
managed it. As stated by P. G. & E., the Harrises were not its 
lessees, but E. L. Harris was its tenant "holding over on a 
month-to-month rental under the terms of an agreement of 
lease for a period of one year." It was alleged that, prior to 
the lease to Harris, the property had been leased to A. M. 
Hinman, who had assigned his lease to Arthur W. Dahl and 
Leonard A. Allen with the permission of P. G. & E. Thereafter, 
Dahl and Allen "quitclaimed and surrendered" toP. G. & E. 
all their right, title and interest in and to the Hinman lease. 
P. G. & E. denied that it negligently constructed, main-
tained and operated the premises and that any injury was 
caused by its acts. It admitted that Arthur and Janet were 
asphyxiated by "operation of an unvented butane gas heater" 
in one of the cabins and that Arthur died as a result. An 
affirmative defense of contributory negligence also was pleaded. 
Copies of the two leases of the property were attached to 
the answer of P. G. & E. and incorporated therein by refer-
ence. The first, to Hinman, provided that the lessee had the 
right to construct improvements ''proper and suitable for 
residential and recreational purposes" upon the premises. He 
could remove any improvements which he erected, with certain 
exceptions not here material, before the termination of the 
lease, but any structures not so removed "shall be deemed to 
be fixtures constituting a part of said premises and title thereto 
shall thereupon automatically vest in" P. G. & E. 
The one-year lease to Harris contained a similar provision 
and provided further that: "Lessee shall not permit any dis-
orderly conduct or nuisance to exist on said premises." P. G. 
& E. was given the right of entry during the term of the lease 
' 'for the purpose of inspecting'' the premises and determining 
if Harris was complying with the terms o:f the lease. Harris 
promised to keep the buildings in repair and return them to 
P. G. & E. in good condition at the termination o:f the lease. 
Tt was provided that any holding over after the expiration of 
4o c.2ct-9 
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tit(' Jemw with tlH• eonsent of 1'. (). & B. Rhould be <~onsidt>red 
<1 tewnwy from month to month on the trrms 11nrl comlitions 
spP(·ifierl in the lease. 
TIH~ am;wer of the IlarriRes and Mrs. Kartem; denied all of 
the material allegations of the complaint and specifically 
llenied that the accident was due to any negligence upon their 
part. 'l'hey also interposed the affirmative defense of con-
tributory negligence. 
'l'her·e is virtually no dispute as to the facts. Viewed in tlw 
I ight most favorable to the plaintiffs, with all inconsistencies 
ditiregarded and only tlwse inferences favorable to the plain-
tiffs whieh reasonably can be drawn from the evidence con-
sidered, the evidence may be summarized as follows: 
P. G. & E. owned eertain real property which it leased to 
Hinman. Sometime prior to the termination of that lease, 
improvements were placed upon the property, including three 
strPet(·ars eon verted into living and sleeping accommodations. 
'l'hese improvements, not having been removed at the time 
the lease was terminated, became the property of P. G. & E. 
Hinman, with the permission of P. G. & E., assigned his 
lease to Dahl and Allen, who thereafter purported to sublet 
the premises to Green. Harris originally took possession of the 
pr-operty from Green under an agreement whereby he pur-
ehased Green's stock in trade and operating equipment and 
rentrd the premises from him. Thereafter, the Harrises pur-
ehased and installed the secondhand gas heater which was 
defective. 
~When the heater was purchased, the firebrick provided in 
it~-; construction by the manufacturer to dispel carbon monoxide 
gas was missing. No repairs were made to the heater, nor was 
it ever adjusted for the use of butane gas. It was a type 
designed to operate without a vent, and there was no way a 
fine could be attached to it. Harris installed the heater by 
eonneeting it to a pipe from a central butane gas tank which 
supplied the various structures on the premises. This pipe 
entered the streetcar cabin at an opening in the wall opposite 
the side of the structure in which a vent had been constructed. 
'rhe tank and gas for the premises were supplied by the Glen-
brook Gas Company of Nevada City. The heater was not 
fastene<l down, but "was just sitting there" on the floor. It 
eould be removed simply by detaching the pipe connection. 
In response to Green's request for a lease, P. G. & E. sent 
an employee to the premises to determine whether he was 
''a proper man to run a decent sort of place.'' This was 
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about three months after the heater was installed. P. G. & E. 
then discovered that Harris was in possession of the premises. 
1'he investigator was expected to determine whether the place 
was "run sloppery, was it a messy looking place or not ... " 
and also if the premises were reasonably safe. Harris informed 
the investigator that he intended to use the property as a 
garag·e, motel and restaurant. 
P. G. & E. decided to deal directly with Harris. It secured 
a surrender of the existing lease from Dahl and Allen and 
entered into a new one-year lease with Harris. At that time, 
improvements upon the property consisted of a garage, rcstan-
rant, honse, pump bouse, water tower, three converted street-
ears, and two log cabins. Beside the house and visible from 
the highway was a large sign reading, "CAnrNs 2.50 and UP." 
The record contains only the most sketchy description of 
the streetcar cabins. No dimensions are shown, nor is it 
clear how many windows and doors each contained. Both 
the windows and an outside door were in proper working 
order; all opened easily. The windows were ''regular street-
ear windows,'' operated by pushing a strap up and permitting 
the window to drop down. No directions were provided as 
to the manner of operating them. 
Each streetcar apparently was divided into two so-called 
"cabins" by an open partition across the car. On each side 
of the partition was a ben, eomplete with bedding, and a very 
limited amount of other furniture. It appears that the space 
on each side of the partition was heated by a single gas 
heater installed in one of the two rooms. The streetcars never 
were licensed for use as a motel. 
The record shows that employees of P. G. & E., apparently 
surveyors and other operating personnel, were on and about 
the premises upon several occasions after the lease with Harris 
was executed, but there is no evidence of any further attempt 
by P. G. & E. to inspect the property. Sometime after the 
Pxpiration of the term of tl1e lease, while Harris was holding 
over on a month to month tenancy, an inspector for the De-
partment of Industrial Relations, Division of Housing, in-
spected the premises. He informed the Harrises that the 
streetcar cabins did not conform to statutory requirements 
for an auto court. According to him, they were too small 
and not of the proper structural dimensions, had insufficient 
window spaee, and laeked running water with a drain. Be-
eause of these defects, he told the Harrises that the street-
car cabins must not be offered for overnight occupancy, but 
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could be rented on a weekly or monthly basis. Thereafter, 
they were not rented for one night except to Arthur and 
Janet at the time of the accident. They were, however, rented 
by the week or month during the succeeding year and had 
been occupied by friends of the Harrises upon several oc-
casions. 
On the day preceding the accident, Arthur and Janet left 
about 5 a. m. for a ski trip. They spent the entire day skiing, 
and were returning home in Arthur's automobile when, about 
midnight, it broke down near the Harris garage. A heavy 
snowstorm was then raging. Harris towed the disabled ve-
hicle to his garage and Arthur and ,Janet took refuge in the 
adjacent restaurant. There they fell asleep at a table and, 
after having been requested to move by a group desiring to 
play cards, again fell asleep at the counter. 
Dorothy Harris awakened them and asked if they would 
like to sleep in a cabin overnight until the automobile could 
be repaired. Janet refused, explaining that they were not 
married, and Dorothy offered them adjoining cabins, which 
they accepted. Dorothy prepared the streetcar cabin for 
them and lighted the gas heater, turning it on almost all 
the way. She did not open any windows, and when she left 
the cabin she closed the door. Returning to the young couple, 
she directed them to the cabin through the blizzard. 
Upon entering the cabin, Janet took off her ski boots and 
lay down upon the bed, covering herself with blankets. She 
noticed that the heater was on, but paid no further attention 
to it. According to her, Arthur tried without success to open 
a window and commented that ''they wouldn't open.'' He 
opened the door, but the wind blew it all the way open so 
he slammed it shut. Janet fell asleep and remembered nothing 
further until she awoke more than 30 hours later in a hos-
pital. She recalled only a dim sensation of suffocation dur-
ing the night and a feeling that she wanted to get out into 
the fresh air. 
The next morning. the Harrises found Arthur dead on the 
bed in one room and ,Janet unconscious upon the floor in the 
other one. Both were fully clothed except for shoes. The 
heater was still burning, the windows and door were closed, 
and snow was piled against the door. Medical testimony es-
tablishes that Janet suffered permanent injury as the result of 
asphyxiation. 
At the conclusion of the plaintiffs' case, all of the de-
fendants moved for a nonsuit. The motions were granted 
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at-> to Mrs. Kart(~us and P. G. & E. Thereupon, the court 
was advised that the matter harl been settled as to the liar-
rises. The cam;e was then ordered off calendar and the jury 
discharged. The appeal is from only the judgment of non-
suit in favor of P. G. & E. 
The plaintiffs contend that a landlord who rents property 
with knowledge that it is to be used for a public or semi-
public purpose is liable to third persons injured upon the 
premises by a defect therein which existed at the time of 
making or renewing the lease. The questions of the existence 
of a dangerous condition upon the premises, and its causal 
relation to the injury, are, they say, ones of fact which should 
have been left to the determination of the jury. 
P. G. & E. does not disagree with the statement of the 
rule that a landlord is liable for injuries resulting from a 
defective condition of the premises existing at the time of 
entering into a lease where the property is to be used for 
a public purpose. However, it argues that the rule is in-
applicable to the facts disclosed by this record. It concedes 
that a dangerous condition, the defective gas heater, existed 
upon the premises at the time of making the lease, and that 
the heater caused the injuries. But the defect, it says, was 
in the property of the tenant, and not in the premises rented 
to Harris. 
[1] ''A lessor who leases property for a purpose involv-
ing the admission of the public is under a duty to see that 
it is safe for the purposes intended and to exercise reason-
able care to inspect and repair the property before posses-
sion is transferred so as to prevent any unreasonable risk 
of harm to the public who may enter." (Hayes v. Richfield 
Oil Corp., 38 Cal.2d 375, 380 [240 P.2d 580] ; Bttrroughs 
v. Ben's Auto Park, Inc., 27 Cal.2d 449, 453 [164 P.2d 897] .) 
'rhe parties agree that this is the well established rule. The 
difficulty arises in applying the principle to the facts of 
this case. 
Upon oral argument, for the first time, the plaintiffs con-
tended that whether the defective heater was so affixed to 
the premises as to have become a part of the realty was a 
question of fact which should have been submitted to the 
jury. They based their position in this regard upon Knell 
v. JJ1orris, 39 Cal.2d 450, 456 [247 P.2d 352]. 
In that case, a question arose as to whether ''a nine-section, 
cast-iron, gas-fired water heater" constituted a part of the 
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prerni;;;es. The <:onrt said: "vVhether a water heater is realty 
nr personalty is, of eo nnw, a question of faet ( eitations), and 
various faeior;:; mm:t be eon:-;idPred, such as the manner of 
its annexatio11, its adaptability to the purpose for which the 
realty is used, and the intention of the party making the 
annexation. (Citation.) As to innocent third parties, the 
intent which controls is that which is reasonably manifested 
by physieal fad;; and outwan1 appearances, rather than any 
express or implied intent of those making the annexation. 
(Citations.) In the present case it can reasonably be in-
ferred that the heater was attached to the building by means 
of gas and water pipes, and the evidence, although meager, is 
sufficient to permit a finding that the heater was permanently 
affixed to the realty and was adapted to the purpose for 
which the premises were used.'' 
[2] Here, there is no evidence from which it reasonably 
could be inferred that the gas heater was so affixed to the 
building as to have become a part of the realty. It was a 
small and easily portable piece of equipment, not fastened 
down in any manner but "just sitting there" on the floor. 
It was connected to the gas pipe inlet, but could be detached 
simply and easily without affecting the premises. The very 
defect which caused these injuries made it unadaptable to 
the purpose for which the realty was used. Even if it had 
been a proper heater, it would not have been "essential to 
the ordinary and convenient use of the property." (M. P. 
Moller, Inc. v. Wilson, 8 Cal.2d 31, 38 [63 P.2d 818] .) The 
ease with which it could be removed and replaced without 
affecting the physical premises negatived any intent to make 
it a permanent fixture and part of the realty. Thus, the 
evidence fails to raise any issue of fact which should have 
been submitted to the jury. 
'l'he plaintiffs concede that, if the heater had not become 
a part of the realty, it was not the property of P. G. & E. 
and was not leased by the corporation to Harris. However, 
they argue that it was a defective condition existing ''on'' 
the premises at the time the lease was entered into. They also 
claim that the premises were defective in that the streetcar 
cabin was not fit for rental as a tourist cabin because it lacked 
''vents which were connected up with the heaters,'' adequate 
space to meet the requirements for sleeping accommodations, 
and adequate window space for proper ventilation. This com-
bination of defeets in the property leased and in a mechanical 
device belonging to and operated by the lessee, they say, 
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created a dangerous condition for which P. G. & E. may be 
held liable. 
[3] ~With every reasonable inference favorable to the plain-
tift's drawn from the evidence, there is no basis in the record 
for the argument that the property of P. G. & E., the street-
car cabin, was itself defective. The cabin did not meet stat-
utory requirements of construction for rental as an over-
night accommodation for transients. But the state's inspector 
told the Harrises that it was permissible to rent the cabin 
by the week or month. In view of this evidence, it is im-
possible to draw the inference that it was unsuitable for 
human occupancy. The cabin did have a vent which could 
be connected to a heating unit and, despite an unwarranted 
assertion to the contrary in the briefs of the plaintiffs, there 
is no indication that the vent was faulty. Nothing in the 
reeord supports the assertion that the cabin lacked proper 
ventilation. It had windows and a door which could be 
opened rasily. I<'rom the evidence, it appears that if they 
had been opened, this tragedy would not have occurred. 
[4] Although the point is not raised in the briefs, the 
District Court of Appeal suggested that the premises were 
defective because the gas feeder line entered the cabin at 
a point on the wall opposite the location of the vent. How-
ever, there is no showing that the pipe was incapable of ex-
tension, or that a vented heater could not have been installed. 
Nor is there any indication that a proper unvented heater 
would have been mmafe if installed in the cabin. The point 
of entry of the gas linr, obviously chosen for convenience, is 
no basis for an inference that, because of its location, a safe 
heating unit could not have been installed. 
[5] The very most which is disclosed by the evidence is 
the negligent operation of a defective gas heater in a cabin 
which was otherwise safe and suitable for human habitation. 
'!'here is no basis in the record for an inferenee that the 
heater, although defeetive, would have eaused injury if oper-
ated with eircumspection in a properly ventilated room. On 
the contrary, the evidenee shows that the heater had been 
operated in this eabin without incident for a period of sev-
eral years. 
[6] Under the eireumstances, liability may be imposed 
upon P. G. & K only if it was rrspom;ible for a latent dan-
gerous condition of its lessee's property which existed upon 
the premises at the time of the execution of the lease. Re-
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search of counsel and this court has disclosed no decision 
in any jurisdiction imposing liability for the defective con-
dition of property other than that leased. In every case 
where, under the rule agreed upon by the parties, a landlord 
has been found liable, the defect was one existing as a struc-
tural part of the property leased. (Hayes v. Richfield Oil 
Corp., supra, unguarded grease pit in gasoline service sta-
tion; Burroughs v. Ben's Auto Pa1·k, Inc., supra, unguarded 
drop-off from parking lot retaining wall to areaway 12 feet 
below; King v. New Masonic Temple Assn., 51 CaLApp.2d 
512 [125 P.2d 559], uneven step from row of seats to floor 
of auditorium; Boothby v. Town of Yreka City, 117 Cal.App. 
643 [4 P.2d 589), faulty stairway in public building.) In 
each instance, the defective condition, being a part of the 
demised premises, was one which the lessor could have re-
paired and was under a duty to correct. 
[7] Frequently, situations arise where injury results from 
activity of the lessee upon premises which, by reason of some 
defect, are not reasonably suitable for such conduct. When 
this occurs, the lessor may be held liable, not for the fault 
of the lessee, but only for his own fault in renting property 
not safe for the activity to be conducted. A recent example 
of this type of situation involved liability of the owner of 
a fairgrounds for injuries suffered by a spectator at a "hot 
rod'' race being conducted by its licensee. (Gibson v. Shelby 
County Fair Assn., 241 Iowa 1349 [ 44 N.W.2d 362].) The 
petition alleged that the barriers and guards upon the premises 
were unsuitable for such purposes and that the plaintiff was 
injured by a wheel which became detached from one of the 
racing cars. The appellate court reversed an order sustaining 
a motion to dismiss the petition. It agreed that the landlord 
could not be liable for negligence in the operation of the 
race, but held that the corporation owed a duty to see that 
the premises were reasonably suited to the activity to be 
eonducted. 
In Larson v. Calder's Pa1·k Co., 54 Utah 325 [180 P. 599, 
4 A.L.R. 731], the plaintiff was injured by a bullet from a 
shooting gallery. The evidence disclosed that the walls of 
the rented building in which the business was conducted were 
dilapidated and contained large holes and cracks through 
which bullets could escape. This condition existed at the 
time of the lease. The lessor was held liable for the de-
fective condition of the walls which rendered the building 
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unsafe for the operation of a shooting gallery. Here, again, 
liability was predicated upon the condition of the property 
leased, not the fault of the lessee in operating the property. 
Manning v. Leavitt Co., 90 N.H. 167 [5 A.2d 667], dealt 
with injuries caused by a mechanical device upon leased 
premises. The evidence indicated that a permanent wave 
machine in a beauty parlor was either defective or negligently 
operated, or both. Except for the fact that it is not shown 
when the machine was installed upon the premises, the factual 
situation is substantially identical to that in the present case. 
[8] The court stated the rule of liability of the lessor as 
follows: 
"This plaintiff's injuries were not due to any want of care 
with respect to the condition of the premises. The duty of 
the invitor-lessor does not extend to matters having to do 
merely with the lessee's management or operation of premises 
which would be safe but for such management or operation, 
at least where the lessee is in sole actual control, as was 
true in this case. The fact that a fault of the lessee or his 
servant commonly concurs with the lessor's failure to see 
to the safety of the premises should not blind us to the basic 
principle, upon which the invitation cases rest, that the lessor 
in ordinary circumstances cannot be held for the lessee's 
fault, but solely .for his own." (P. 169.) 
The reasoning of the New Hampshire court is equally ap-
plicable to the present case. [9] P. G. & E. had a duty 
to see that the property which it leased was reasonably safe 
for the purposes for which it was to be used and the right 
to repair such defects as it might discover in the premises. 
But it was under no obligation to inspect property which 
it did not own and which its lessee intended to use in the op-
eration of his business. Failure to remedy any defect in 
the appliance was a fault of Harris, not of P. G. & E. 
[10] The rule that a lessor must make his property safe 
for the purposes for which it is to be used cannot be ex-
tended to require him to insure against defects in, or negli-
gent operation of, the property of another which may be 
brought upon his premises for the conduct of the business. 
Because the evidence discloses no defect in the leased 
premises which may have caused or contributed to the in-
juries which are the basis of this action, the motion for non-
suit was granted properly as to P. G. & E. This conclusion 
266 GooDMAN v. HARRIS [40 C.2d 
makes it unnecessary to discuss any of the other contentions 
of the parties. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
CAR'l'EH, J.-I dissent. 
The facts are stated most favorably to the defendant in the 
majority opinion, but even that statement of the facts of the 
tragedy, together with the result achieved and set forth there, 
are sufficient to shock the conscience and sense of justice of 
any fair-minded person. 
This case came to this court on an appeal from a judgment 
of nonsuit entered in favor of the defendant Pacific Gas and 
Electric Company. A motion for nonsuit can only be prop-
erly granted when, disregarding conflicting evidence and 
giving to plaintiffs' evidence all the value to which it is legally 
entitled, and indulging in every legitimate inference which 
may be drawn from that evidence, it can be said that there 
is no substantial evidence to support a verdict for plaintiffs 
had such a verdict been rendered. That is the test which should 
have been applied here. 
The crucial question here is whether the heater, admittedly 
defective, which was installed in the streetcar cabin occupied 
by the two young people, (one of whom met his death as 
a result thereof, the young woman receiving permanent 
and serious injuries as a result of the experience) was a 
fixture (part of the premises) belonging to the lessor, P. G. 
& E., or personalty, belonging to the tenant. 
It is said in the majority opinion that "there is no evidence 
from which it could reasonably be inferred that the gas heater 
was so affixed to the building as to have become a part of 
the realty. It was a small and easily portable piece of equip-
ment, not fastened down in any manner but 'just sitting 
there' on the floor. It was connected to the gas pipe inlet, but 
could be detached simply and easily without affecting the 
premises. The very defect which caused these injuries made 
it unadaptable to the purpose for which the realty was used. 
Even if it had been a proper heater, it would not have been 
'essential to the ordinary and convenient use of the property.' 
(M.P. Moller, Inc. v. Wilson, 8 Cal.2d 31, 38 [63 P.2d 818] .) 
The ease with which it could be removed and replaced without 
affecting the physical premises negatived any intent to make 
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it a permanent fixture and part of the realty. Thus, the evi-
dence fails to raise any issue of fact which should have been 
submitted to the jury." (Emphasis added.) 
With the above statement, I most emphatically disagree. 
This court has again paid .lip-service to established rules and 
then proceeded to refuse to apply the rules to the situation 
at hand. It is admitted that P. G. & E. had a duty to see that 
the property which it leased was reasonably safe for the pur-
poses for which it was to be used and the right to repair such 
defects as it might discover in the premises; that ''A lessor 
who leases property for a purpose involving the admission 
of the public is under a duty to see that it is safe for the 
purposes intended and to exercise reasonable care to inspect 
and repair the property before possession is transferred so as 
to prevent any unreasonable risk of harm to the public who 
may enter" (Hayes v. Richfield Oil Corp., 38 Cal.2d 375, 
:380 [240 P.2d 580] ; Burrmtghs v. Ben's Auto Park, Inc., 27 
Cal.2d 449, 453 [ 164 P .2d 897] ) . The only way this court 
could find to side-step these rules was to hold that there was 
no evidence from which it could be inferred that the gas heater 
was so affixed to the building as to have become part of the 
realty. This statement ignores the recent case of Knell v. 
J1forn:s, 39 Cal.2d 450 [247 P.2d 352]. 
In the Knell case, supra, it was said that "\Vhether a water 
heater is realty or personalty is, of course, a question of fact 
(see M. P. Moller, Inc. v. Wilson, 8 Cal.2d 31, 38 [63 P.2d 
818) ; 22 Am.Jur. 772-773), and various factors must be con-
sidered, such as the manner of its annexation, its adaptability 
to the purpose for which the realty is used, and the intention 
of the party making the annexation. (See fHmms v. County 
of Los Angeles, 35 Cal.2d 303, 309 [217 P.2d 936] .) As to 
innocent third parties, the intent which controls is that which 
is reasonably mani.fested by physical facts and outward ap-
J)eamnces, rather than any expr·ess or implied intent o.f those 
making the annexation. (See Simms v. County of Los Angeles, 
:)f) Cal.2cl 303, 309 [217 P.2d 936] ; Trabue Pittman Corp. v. 
County of Los Angeles, 29 Cal.2d 385, 397 [175 P.2d 5121; 
M. P. Moller, Inc. v. Wason, 8 Cal.2d 31, 37-38 [63 P.2d 818] ; 
People v. Ch~trch, 57 Cal.App.2d Supp. 1032, 1048 !136 P.2d 
1391.) Iu the present case it can reasonably be inferred that 
the hPater was attaehed to the building by means of gas and 
water pipes, and the evidenee, although meager, is sufficient 
to wrmit a finding that the heater was permanently affixed 
to the realty and was adapted to the purpose for which the 
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premises were used. (Of. Broadway l1np. &; Inv. Co. v. Tuman-
sky, 2 Oal.2d 465,468-469 [41 P.2d 553].)" (Emphasis 
added.) All seven members of this court concurred in that 
opinion. Five months later, a majority of this court now agree 
that there is no evidence from which it could possibly be in-
ferred that the heater here was affixed to the realty. 
"No evidence"? In reviewing a judgment of nonsuit we 
are supposed to state the facts most favorably to plaintiff 
and to draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in his favor 
(Knell v. Morris, supra, 39 Oal.2d 450). 
The cabin was one presumably intended for use by memben: 
of the public; it was located in the high Sierra; it was open 
on February 3rd (the time of the death and injury) during 
the skiing season which, in itself, allows the inference that 
the weather was inclement, to say the least ; the windows of 
the cabin were not opened by Mrs. Harris, and could not be 
opened by the deceased; the door was so arranged that when 
opened, it was blown wide open by the blizzard; the heater in 
the cabin was admittedly defective and was connected to the 
gas pipe inlet. From this evidence alone, it is certainly reason-
able to infer that a cabin located in the mountains and appar-
ently available for use by the public during the winter season 
must have some means by which it could be heated; that the 
heater was to be used for that purpose; that its presence there 
would be considered by an innocent third person, if he gave the 
matter a second thought, as much a part of the premises as 
the walls of the building. From the fact that plaintiff's 
decedent, an apparently healthy young man (inferable from 
the fact that he had been on a skiing trip) could not open the 
windows, it may easily be inferred that the windows were 
difficult to open. To say, as it is said in the majority opinion, 
that "Even if it had been a proper heater, it would not have 
been ''essential to the ordinary and convenient use of the prop-
erty' '' is so ridiculous, when applied to this case, that it 
justifies the appellation of Mr. Bumble in Dickens' Oliver 
Twist that "the law is a ass, a idiot." It completely ignores 
the practicalities of trying to stay in a cabin, without heating 
facilities, in zero and sub-zero weather. 
Rather than drawing inferences and stating facts favorable 
to the plaintiffs, as we are required to do, the majority of this 
court goes to great lengths to draw unfavorable inferences 
and state facts unfavorable to plaintiffs. It is said that the 
heater was easily removable, that it was "just sitting there, 
on the floor; that it was unadaptable to the purpose for which 
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the realty was to be used because of the "very defect which 
caused these injuries." Of cour·se, an innocent third person 
would at once be aware of the defects in the heater, and say 
to himself that "this heater is not part of the realty" before 
putting himself to bed. It is also inferred that even a "proper 
heater" would not have been essential to the ordinary and 
convenient use of the property! It is stated in the majority 
opinion that "Nothing in the record supports the assertion 
that the cabin lacked proper ventilation. It had windows and 
a door which could be opened easily.'' ''Nothing in the record'' 
is an erroneous statement. The record shows that an inspector 
for the Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Hous-
ing, inspected the premises and that one of the reasons this 
cabin could not be used for motel purposes was that there 
was inadequate window space for proper ventilation. The 
record also shows that the windows could not be opened easily. 
In M.P. Moller, Inc. v. Wilson, 8 Cal.2d 31 [63 P.2d 818], 
the court said that ''Whether under the circumstances of each 
case the property has lost its character as personalty and has 
become a fixture is primarily a question of fact to be de-
termined by the evidence.'' In Simms v. County of Los An-
geles, 35 Cal.2d 303, 309 [217 P.2d 936] it was said "It is 
settled that three tests must be applied 'in determining 
whether or not an article is a fixture-namely: (1) the manner 
of its annexation; (2) the adaptability to the use and purpose 
for which the realty is used; and (3) the intention of the party 
making the annexation.' (San Diego T. & S. Bank v. San 
D1:ego County, 16 Cal.2d 142, 149 [105 P.2d 94, 133 A.L.R. 
416].) It is also settled that for tax purposes the 'intention' 
must be determined by the physical facts or reasonably mani-
fested outward appearances without regard to the annexor's 
status as landlord or tenant.'' In Trabue Pittman Corp. v. 
County of Los Angeles, 29 Cal.2d 385, 393 [175 P.2d 512], it 
was said "Section 660 of the Civil Code defines 'fixtures' as 
things that are permanently resting upon or attached to the 
land or building, but the fact that a trade fixture is removable 
under Civil Code, section 1019, does not, as plaintiff contends, 
necessarily negative such element of permanence. We have 
already indicated that for the most part assessors must be 
allowed to act on the basis of outward appearances. Moreover, 
in distinguishing permanence from transitoriness it is not 
necessary to identify it with perpetuality. (Southern Cal. Tel. 
Co. v. State Boa1·d of Eqnalization, snpra, 12 Cal.2d 127, 136 
[82 P.2d422].) 'It appears to be sufficient that it [the article 
270 GooDMAN v. HARRIS [40 C.2d 
annexed] is intended to remain where placed as long as the 
land or building to which it is annexed may be used for the 
same purpose.' ( 36 C .• T.S., Fixtures, § 2, p. 900.) 'It is suffi-
cient if the article shall appear to be intended to remain where 
fastened until worn out, until the purpose to which the realty 
is devoted has been accomplished or until the article is super-
seded by another article more suitable for the purpose.' (San 
Diego Trust & Sa;v. Bank v. County of San Diego, supra, 16 
Ca1.2d 142, 151; 26 C.J. 657.)" 
'l'he question of whether or not an appliance attached to 
realty is a fixture or personalty is always a question of fact 
unless the evidence is undisputed and is susceptible only of 
one inference (San Diego Trust & Sav. Bank v. County of San 
Diego, 16 Cal.2d 142 [105 P.2d 94, 133 A.L.R. 416] ). 
Applying the three tests set forth in the Simms case, supra, 
it is at once apparent that the evidence was more than suffi-
cient to permit submission of the question of whether or not 
the heater in question was a fixture or personalty to the jury. 
The heater here was physically annexed to the realty by a 
gas pipe inlet. Its adaptability to the use and purpose for 
which the realty was used is apparent. It was the only heater 
available to produce warmth in a cabin located in the moun-
tains where zero and sub-zero weather prevailed during the 
wintertime which was when this tragedy occurred. The in-
tention of the party making the annexation must be determined 
by that which is reasonably manifested by physical facts and 
outward appearances "rather than any express or implied in-
tent of those making the annexation" (Knell v. Morris, supra, 
::39 Cal.2d 450). Certainly the article here involved appeared 
to be intended to remain where it was fastened until it was 
worn out, or until the purpose to which the realty was devoted 
had been accomplished or until the article was superseded 
by another article more suitable for the purpose (San Diego 
Trust & Sav. Bank v. County of San Diego, supra, 16 Cal.2d 
142). 
I would reverse the judgment. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied March 
16, 1953. Carter, .T., was of the opinion that the petition 
shonh1 be granted. 
